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Search and Seizure-KNOWLEDGE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS NOT A
PREREQUISITE TO A VALID CONSENT SEARCH-Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973).*
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution,' applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment,2 guarantees to every
citizen the indefeasible right to be secure against unreasonable searches
and seizures. As a response to a long history of English colonial abuses,3
the fourth amendment was intended by the drafters of the Bill of Rights4
to be a safeguard against governmental misuse of the writs of assistance'
and the general warrant.' The Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the
constitutional mandate of the fourth amendment as proscribing all
searches and seizures which do not comply with its stringent provisions.'
However, certain specifically established and well-defined exceptions to
* Subsequent to printing, this case has been reported in 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
2. ". .. [N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
Rees v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 850, 127 S.E.2d 406 (1962).
3. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting):
[T]he Amendment's proscription of "unreasonable searches and seizures" must be
read in light of "the history that gave rise to the words" - a history of "abuses so
deeply felt by the Colonies as to be one of the potent causes of the Revolution ..
Id. at 760-61.
4. See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 604-05 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). For
a comprehensive analysis of the fourth amendment in its historical perspective see Lasson,
The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
55 THE JOHN HOPKINS STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (Part 2) 1 (1937); Note,
Warrantless Searches in Light of Chimel: A Return to the Original Understanding, 11 ARiz.
L. REv. 457, 460-75 (1969).
5. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886). Writs of assistance did not require
a showing of probable cause before a magistrate, nor was any judicial supervision provided
for their use. See generally Carden, Federal Power to Seize and Search Without Warrant, 18
VAND. L. REv. 1 (1964); Lasson, note 4 supra at 39-40.
6. The historical development of the general warrant can be traced to the infamous Star
Chamber. It was not until 1765 that the practice of issuing general warrants was renounced
by the English courts. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-41 (1886). The House of
Commons declared the general warrant illegal in 1776. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98, 100 n.1 (1959).
7. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) the Court stated:
[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge
or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only
to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions. Id. at 357.
[359]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the warrant requirement have been judicially recognized as being within
the general framework of the Constitution.8 One such recognized exception
is a search conducted pursuant to voluntary consent.'
In the recent case of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,'5 the United States
Supreme Court ruled" that the fourth amendment does not require a law
enforcement officer to warn an individual who is not in custody of his
constitutional right to refuse to consent to a warrantless search.
In Schneckloth, a California1 2 police officer stopped an automobile for a
minor traffic violation,'" and after discovering that the only person possess-
ing a driver's license was a passenger, the officer requested the six passen-
gers, including Bustamonte, to step out of the car. With the consent of the
bailee of the automobile," the officer searched the car. Subsequently, three
8. For a general cataloging of the recognized exceptions and supporting cases see Vale v.
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970); Wheeler v. Goodman, 330 F. Supp. 1356, 1361-62
(W.D.N.C. 1971); One 1963 Chevrolet Pickup Truck v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 506, 158
S.E.2d 755 (1968).
9. See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Henry v. Commonwealth, 211
Va. 48, 175 S.E.2d 416 (1970). For discussion and analysis of consent searches see C. BERRY,
ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 91-99 (1973); W. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND
CONFESSIONS (1972); Miles and Wefing, The Automobile Search and the Fourth Amendment:
A Troubled Relationship, 4 SErON HALL L. REv. 105 (1972).
10. 93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973).
11. The decision of the Court presented no concensus among the Justices as to the reasons
for the holding. Justice Stewart wrote the opinion of the Court based on the consent search
situation presented by the facts. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist, concurred in the Court's opinion but based his reasoning on the peripheral issue
of federal collateral review of habeas corpus, failing to even mention the consent search issue
presented by the facts. Justice Blackmun filed a separate concurring opinion which agreed
with the reasoning advanced by Justice Powell but questioned its applicability to the facts
of the case. Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall filed separate dissenting opinions which
were based on the issue of whether an individual can consent to a search without the knowl-
edge that he has the right to refuse to consent, the dominant issue presented in Schneckloth.
The Court's holding thus presents four opinions: the "majority" opinion, the three-Justice
concurring opinion, the separate concurring opinion, and the three dissenting opinions based
on the facts. Clearly, there is no definitive holding presented on the facts of the case.
12. For a discussion of the California judicial system and unlawful search and seizure
claims see Manwaring, California and the Fourth Amendment, 16 STAN. L. REV. 318 (1964).
13. The officer, while on routine patrol in the early hours of the morning, "observed that
one headlight and its license plate light were burned out." 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2044 (1973). See
generally Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 314 (1966).
14. The majority of courts have recognized as valid a consent to search given by a bailee
of an automobile. See, e.g., United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962); United
States v. Mazzella, 295 F. Supp. 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Hamilton v. State, 260 F. Supp. 632
(E.D.N.C. 1966); Henry v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 48, 175 S.E.2d 416 (1970); Hotis, Search
of Motor Vehicles, 73 DICK. L. REV. 363, 417-20 (1969); 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 82 (1966); 33 U.
CHI. L. REV. 797 (1966). But see B. GEORGE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN
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stolen checks were found, which, with other evidence, was later used to
convict Bustamonte of possessing a check with intent to defraud. No arrest
had been made at the time of the search and the entire sequence of events
took place in a "cogenial" atmosphere.'"
While the fourth amendment prohibits an unreasonable search and sei-
zure,'" the determination of reasonableness 7 depends on the particular
facts of each case. Consequently, the circumstances surrounding a consent
search receive close scrutiny by the courts.'" In evaluating the source of the
consent, the courts have stressed that one who has a definite possessory
interest in the property to be searched has standing to consent to the
search. 9 As with the waiver of any constitutional right, the consent to
conduct a search which would otherwise be constitutionally prohibited"
must be knowingly and intelligently given,' and must be voluntary and
"uncontaminated by any duress or coercion, actual or implied."22
CRIMINAL CASES 448 (1973).
15. According to uncontradicted testimony at trial, the ballee of the car, Alcala, actively
assisted the patrolman in searching the car. People v. Bustamonte, 270 Cal. 2d 648, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 17 (Ct. App.) (1969). See generally Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 858 (1966).
16. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 772-73 (1969) (White, J., dissenting); Kirby v.
Commonwealth, 209 Va. 806, 167 S.E.2d 411 (1969).
17. As with all legal principles which involve the concept of "reasonableness", the courts
have attempted to delineate the various components which could be useful in defining a
"reasonable" search. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), where the Supreme
Court summarizes the result of its efforts:
What is a reasonable search is not determined by any fixed formula. The Constitution
does not define what are "unreasonable" searches, and, regrettably, in our discipline
we have no ready litmus-paper test. Id. at 63.
18. Whether a search and seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. See, e.g., Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364, 366 (1964). See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 36 (1970) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516, 520 (5th Cir. 1972); Cabbler v. Commonwealth,
212 Va. 520, 184 S.E.2d 781 (1971).
19. As a general rule, the constitutional right to privacy is personal to the individual and
cannot be waived by a third party. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964). However,
the right of a third party to consent to a search of jointly controlled property has been
judicially recognized by a majority of courts. For an enumeration of cases see United States
ex rel. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839, 845-46 (3d Cir. 1970).
20. Judicial hostility to consent searches is evident in the requirement that the state bear
the burden of proving that the consent given was voluntary and uncoerced. See, e.g., United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); Morris v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 331, 157 S.E.2d
191 (1967). In addition, the courts will not lightly infer a waiver of fourth amendment rights
and will "indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464 (1938) quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937).
21. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 594 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
United States v. Vickers, 387 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp.
268 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 68, 161 S.E.2d 787 (1968).
22. Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217, 219 (9th Cir. 1960). See Bumper v. North
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The majority in Schneckloth closely followed the reasoning of previous
Court decisions which defined "voluntariness" in the context of an in-
custody interrogation.3 Discerning a clear distinction between the consti-
tutional mandates of the fourth and fifth amendments with respect to
consent searches and in-custody interrogation,2 4 the Court reasoned that
the circumstances surrounding a consent search do not present the same
grave danger of coercion that is inherent in an in-custody interrogation
situation. 5 The Court recognized that consent must still be voluntary, but
in the absence of a coercive element, knowledge of the right to withold
consent is merely one factor in determining the validity of the consent.26
The concurring opinion in Schneckloth does not discuss the factual situ-
ation presented, and its failure to do so results in an equal division among
the Justices on the constitutional issue of consent to search. Instead, the
opinion addresses the broader, theoretical aspects of the availability of
federal habeas corpus to a state prisoner asserting an allegedly unlawful
search and seizure claim under the fourth amendment.21 In stressing the
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Karwicki v. United
States, 55 F.2d 225, 226 (4th Cir. 1936) (per curiam); United States v. Kuntz, 265 F. Supp.
543 (N.D.N.Y. 1967).
23. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). After examining the various definitions it had
previously established, the Court concluded that the "traditional" determination of voluntar-
iness-"the totality of all the surrounding circumstances"-is also applicable to consent
searches. 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2046-52 (1973).
24. 93 S. Ct. at 2054-59. But see Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630-35 (1886); 46 N.C. L. REv. 142, 144 (1967).
25. 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2054-59. In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), the Court also
decided that when compared to the likelihood of a coerced confession in in-custody interroga-
tion, "there is no likelihood of unreliability or coercion present in a search-and-seizure case."
Id. at 638. The dissenting opinions in Schneckloth view the possibility of coercion as gravely
inherent in the consent search situation. Both Justice Douglas and Justice Marshall stated
that "under many circumstances a reasonable person might read an officer's 'may I' as the
courteous expression of a demand backed by force of law." 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2072, 2079 (1973)
quoting Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1971).
26. 93 S. Ct. at 2048. The Court stated:
While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account,
the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective
consent.
The dissenting opinions of Justices Brennan and Marshall sharply criticize this conclusion.
Justice Brennan summarizes his position as follows:
It wholly escapes me how our citizens can meaningfully be said to have waived some-
thing as precious as a constitutional guarantee without ever being aware of its exist-
ence. Id. at 2073.
Justice Marshall similarly questions the majority's holding, which he claims "confines the
protection of the Fourth Amendment against searches conducted without probable cause to
the sophisticated, the knowledgeable, and, I might add, the few." Id. at 2079.
27. The concurring Justices perceived the central issue of the case as follows:
The specific issue before us, and the only one that need be decided at this time, is the
[Vol. 8:359
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common law development of the writ,28 the concurring Justices concluded
that federal review of fourth amendment claims presently raised by state
prisonersn have extended "well beyond the traditional purposes of the writ
of habeas corpus."" By limiting federal collateral review to only those
claims which have a bearing on the question of innocence,' 1 the historic
purpose of the writ will be reasserted.2 In addition, the protracted litiga-
tion,33 the depreciation of the finality of prior judgments, 3 and the deroga-
tion of the constitutional balance between the federal and state judicial
systems,- which now exists, would be eliminated
2
Implicit in the majority's rationale is a realization of the balance that
must be maintained between the preservation of constitutionally protected
rights and the permissible intrusion on those rights.Y A formal warning,
presented in a specific formula, would at first glance, appear to be an
extent to which a state prisoner may obtain federal habeas corpus review of a Fourth
Amendment claim. Id. at 2067.
28. See, e.g., Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201-02 (1830); Ex parte Bollman, 8
U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807); Bator, Finality in CriminalLaw and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REv. 441 (1963); Oaks, Legal History in the High Court -
Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REv. 451 (1966).
29. In Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969), the Court held that collateral review
of search and seizure claims was appropriate on motions filed by federal prisoners under 28
U.S.C. § 2255. The same privilege for those in state custody is now authorized by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(a) (1964).
30. 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2060 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
31. For a thorough analysis of the question of innocence and federal habeas corpus review
see Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 231 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting); Friendly, Is
Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. Rav. 142
(1970); Pollack, Proposals to Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: Collateral
Attack on the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50 (1956); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconvic-
tion Remedy for State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. Rav. 461 (1960).
32. 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2067 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
33. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring):
Both the individual criminal defendant and society have an interest in insuring that
there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an end to litigation, and that
attention will ultimately be focused not on whether a conviction was free from error
but rather on whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the community.
Id. at 24-25.
34. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Amsterdam, Search, Seizure and
Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. Rav. 378, 383-84 (1964) (The article addresses the
issue of collateral review for federal prisoners, but its argument is equally applicable to state
prisoners).
35. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 464 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893);
Bator, note 28 supra at 451.
36. 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2064-72 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 2046.
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adequate means of safeguarding both interests." In Miranda v. Arizona,31
the Supreme Court announced the absolute necessity of providing an ac-
cused with threshold warnings of his fifth and sixth amendment rights. 0
But even in Miranda, the Court4' clearly stipulated those circumstances
which would require the detailed warning of rights" and those which would
not.43 The fact that a formal warning is required to protect certain constitu-
tional rights does not of itself indicate the need to require a formal warning
to protect all constitutional rights.44
The reasoning of the concurring opinion is relevant in its consideration
of fourth amendment claims presented for federal collateral review.45 The
38. For a model formula to be used by law enforcement officers in presenting a warning of
fourth amendment rights, see Wilberding, Miranda-Type Warnings for Consent Searches?,
47 N.D. L. REv. 281, 284 (1971); Note, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal After Miranda u.
Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 130, 150-68 (1967).
39. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
40. Id. at 471-72. The Court required that any suspect held in custody must be informed
that (1) he has the right to remain silent; (2) anything he does say may be used against him
in a court of law; and (3) he has the right to the presence of an attorney, retained or appointed,
before questioning.
41. The Miranda requirement of a warning of fifth and sixth amendment rights received a
varied reaction from the judicial community, especially in its application to consent searches.
According to one line of cases, the Miranda warning should be applied to all search and
seizure situations, without exception. See, e.g., United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th
Cir. 1966). Other courts perceive no reason to require the Miranda warning in a search and
seizure situation. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 464 F.2d 937 (6th Cir. 1972); Gorman v.
United States, 380 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1967); State v. McCarthy, 199 Kan. 116, 427 P.2d 616
(1967).
42. Only when the suspect is in "custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way" does the requirement of a warning come into force. Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
43. The Court clearly emphasized that:
Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers
investigating crime. . . . General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a
crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected
by our holding. Id. at 477.
44. In Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1967), the court stated:
Although the analogy with Miranda v. State of Arizona. . . has a surface plausibility,
we do not think that the Miranda prescription, formulated to give threshold warnings
of fifth and sixth amendment rights at the earliest critical time in a criminal proceed-
ing, must or ought to be mechanistically duplicated when circumstances indicate the
advisability of requesting a search. Id. at 164.
In People v. Duren, 9 Cal. 3d 218, 507 P.2d 1365, 107 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1973) quoting People
v. Beal, 268 Cal. 2d 481, 485, 73 Cal. Rptr. 787, 790 (1969), the California Supreme Court
concluded:
The trial court's scrutiny of the voluntariness of the consent is far more protection to
a defendant than the recital of some warning by the police. 507 P. 2d at 1381.
45. The reasoning presented in the opinion can be logically applied to any claim presented
by a state or federal prisoner for federal collateral review, regardless of the factual situation.
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historical analysis of the intent and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus
substantially supports the proposition the opinion sets forth. However, by
pursuing the peripheral issue of federal collateral review of habeas corpus,
the concurring Justices failed to confront the central issue presented to the
Court for its review. The failure by the concurring Justices to discuss the
issue of a fourth amendment warning for consent searches results in a less
than definitive ruling on whether a law enforcement officer is required to
give a warning of fourth amendment rights before conducting a consent
search.
The wisdom of the Schneckloth decision is that it resolves the constitu-
tional issue concerning the requirement of fourth amendment warning of
rights within the exact confines of those situations where the consent to
search is voluntarily given, the one giving the consent is not in custody,
and the general atmosphere surrounding the giving of consent is not coer-
cive.46 Only if these elements are present can a law enforcement officer
dispense with a warning of fourth amendment rights. The Court implicitly
recognized that the application of its holding to a different set of facts
would disrupt the precarious constitutional balance it has sought to at-
tain.47 It must be conceded, however, that despite the limitations placed
on its holding, the Court's opinion is greatly undermined by its inability
to present a concensus opinion on the constitutional issue of the necessity
for fourth amendment warnings. In light of the diverse nature of the
Court's opinion, further pronouncements on the issue of whether a law
enforcement officer is required to give warnings of fourth amendment
rights can be expected.
J V. B. 11
46. 93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973):
We hold only that when the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts
to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the
result of duress or coercion, express or implied. Voluntariness is a question of fact to
be determined from all the circumstances, and while the subject's knowledge of a right
to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demon-
strate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent. Id. at 2059.
47. A warning of fourth amendment rights could be required under the Schneckloth
holding where, for example, the officer approached the car with his revolver drawn, and then
requested permission to search. A warning could also be required where the one giving the
consent could not understand the nature of the request to search, as where he was a foreigner
who did not understand English or where he was mentally incapable of understanding.
1974]
